It is inconceivable how chaotic the world would look to humans, faced with innumerable decisions a day to be made under uncertainty, had they been lacking the capacity to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant-a capacity which computationally amounts to handling probabilistic independence relations. The highly parallel and distributed computational machinery of the brain suggests that a satisfying process-level account of human independence judgment should also mimic these features. In this work, we present the first rational, distributed, message-passing, process-level account of independence judgment, called D * . Interestingly, D * shows a curious, but normatively justified tendency for quick detection of dependencies, whenever they hold. Furthermore, D * outperforms all the previously proposed algorithms in the AI literature in terms of worst-case running time, and a salient aspect of it is supported by recent work in neuroscience investigating possible implementations of Bayes nets at the neural level.
Introduction
Is there any connection between the quality of your last night sleep and the color of the shirt your colleague happened to be wearing at work today? How about Mars' current weather and your mood today? We humans judge innumerable such possible connections a day rather effortlessly, appearing to be quite good at teasing apart pertinent from impertinent factors when making decisions. But how does the mind do that? The famous frame problem (Icard & Goodman, 2015; Nobandegani & Psaromiligkos, 2017) , a puzzle in philosophy of mind and epistemology, further highlights this intriguing ability of the mind in distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, and asks a closely related question: "How do we account for our apparent ability to make decisions on the basis only of what is relevant to an ongoing situation without having explicitly to consider all that is not relevant?" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Computationally, the mind's ability of distinguishing the relevant from irrelevant can be characterized in terms of handling probabilistic (in)dependence relations, with 'dependency' implying the existence of connection or relevance between factors and 'independence' the contrary (Pearl, 1986 (Pearl, , 1988 (Pearl, , 2000 . For example, assuming that the random variable x encodes the quality of your sleep, and y the color of the shirt your colleague happened to wear the next day, the nonexistence of any connection between x and y (which seems to be a rational judgment) can be formally characterized using the notion of probabilistic independence: x ⊥ ⊥ y (read x is independent of y).
In this work, we are concerned with developing a plausible, process-level account of human independence judgment. Adopting causal Bayes nets (CBNs) (Pearl, 1988; Gopnik et al., 2004 , inter alia) as a normative model to represent how the reasoner's internal causal model of the world is structured (i.e., reasoner's mental model), the aforesaid task computationally amounts to checking for independencies in the distribution encoded by a CBN. Interestingly, Pearl (1986) put forth a graph-theoretic notion called d-separation, allowing for reading off probabilistic independence relations from the mere structure of a CBN (Pearl, 1986) . 1 Ever since its inception, d-separation has proved fundamental in a variety of domains in artificial intelligence, e.g., probabilistic reasoning (Pearl, 1988) , causal reasoning (Pearl, 2000) , decision making (Shachter, 1998; Koller & Friedman, 2009) , and has played important roles in a broad range of areas, e.g., handling missing data (Mohan & Pearl, 2014) , extrapolation across populations (Pearl & Bareinboim, 2014) , and deep learning (Goodfellow et al., 2016) . In that light, algorithms for implementing d-separation could potentially serve as a rational, process-level model of human independence judgment. But what should such a model look like? The highly parallel and distributed computational machinery of the brain suggests that a satisfying process-level account of human independence judgment should also mimic these features. Sadly enough, all past algorithms for the implementation of d-separation have been sequential (aka serial), i.e., without any parallelism in computation, and, arguably worse, centralized, i.e., their executions are fully coordinated by a supervisory unit, analogous to homunculus (Geiger et al., 1989; Lauritzen et al., 1990; Shachter, 1998; Koller & Friedman, 2009; Butz et al., 2016) , features that strongly call into question their psychological plausibility.
The notion of (conditional) probabilistic independence is a quintessential feature of CBNs, and, interestingly, the realization that probabilistic independence plays a crucial role in human cognition was a key element in the development of the CBN formalism (Pearl, 1986) . In Pearl's (1986) words: "Whereas a person may show reluctance to giving a numerical estimate for a conditional probability P(x i |x j ), that person can usually state with ease whether x i and x j are dependent or independent, namely, whether or not knowing the truth of x i will alter the belief in x j ." He then continues: "Likewise, people tend to judge the three-place relationships of conditional dependency (i.e., x i influences x j given x k ) with clarity, conviction, and consistency. This suggests that the notions of dependence and conditional dependence are more basic to human reasoning than are the numerical values attached to probability judgments." Some psychological literature, however, does not fully embrace the statement "with clarity, conviction, and consistency" as Pearl put it. For example, the experimental work by Rehder (2014) suggests that adults exhibit deviations from the Markov condition (i.e., CBN's independencies entailed by d-separation). In contrast, drawing on the experimental studies of Park and Sloman (2013) , Sloman and Lagnado (2015) conclude that people indeed uphold the Markov condition and the reason behind the observed deviations is that, under experimental conditions, people may not solely adhere to the information provided by the experimenter and may bring their own background knowledge into the experiment (see also Rehder & Waldmann, 2017) . Specifically, Park and Sloman (2013) found strong support for their contradiction hypothesis followed by the mediating mechanism hypothesis, and finally concluded that people do conform to Markov condition once the causal structure people are using is correctly specified (i.e., people's mental causal models).
In this work, we present the first rational, distributed, process-level account of independence judgment, called D * .
More formally, D * is the first asynchronous, messagepassing, distributed algorithm for implementing d-separation, with substantial parallelism in computation, and without any need for a supervisory unit to coordinate its execution (i.e., no synchrony is assumed in D * 's execution)-fully in the spirit of the celebrated parallel distributed processing (PDP) research program in brain and cognitive sciences (McClelland, 1989) . Similar to the well-known belief propagation inference algorithm (Pearl, 1986 (Pearl, , 1988 , which has played important roles in the theoretical neuroscience literature (see e.g., Gershman & Beck, 2017; George & Hawkins, 2009; Litvak & Ullman, 2009; Rao, 2004; Lochmann & Deneve, 2011 
Preliminaries and Notations
Let us introduce the notation adopted in this work. Lower bold-faced letters (e.g., x) denote random variables and upper bold-faced letters (e.g., X) represent sets of random variables. A generic d-separation relation is denoted by (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G with A, B, and C representing three mutually disjoint sets of variables belonging to the directed acyclic graph (DAG) G, where G represents the topology of the underlying CBN. Read (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G as follows:
For ease of notation, we use (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G to denote both a d-separation relation (i.e., C dseparates A from B in DAG G) and to denote a d-separation query (i.e., does C d-separate A from B in DAG G?); the distinction should be clear from the context. Let also G An(K) denote the ancestral graph for the variables in set K belonging to the underlying DAG G (Lauritzen et al., 1990) , i.e., the set of nodes for G An(K) comprises the nodes in K and all the ancestors of the nodes in K (hence, G An(K) is an induced subgraph of the underlying DAG G).
Informally speaking, throughout that paper, (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G should be interpreted as follows: "A and B are probabilistically independent of each other, given C," and, in the query format, as follows: "Are A and B probabilistically independent of each other, given C?" Likewise, (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G should be interpreted as follows: A and B are dependent, given C. 2 Next, a notion called refutation-module is introduced; this will be used later in our formal analysis of D * . Def. 1. (Refutation-Module) Let X, Y, Z be three mutually disjoint sets belonging to a DAG G. Let also (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G . A connected subgraph of G, M (X ⊥ ⊥Y|Z) G , serves as a refutation-module for the query (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G , iff M (X ⊥ ⊥Y|Z) G satisfies the following two conditions: (1) M (X ⊥ ⊥Y|Z) G contains an active path P (Pearl, 1986 ) between a node x ∈ X and a node y ∈ Y, and (2) for every head-to-head node v on P, M (X ⊥ ⊥Y|Z) G contains a directed path between v and a node c ∈ C. See Fig. 1 for some examples.
Def. 2. (Minimal Refutation-Module) Let A, B, C be three disjoint sets of nodes belonging to a DAG G. Also, let
denote the refutation-module for the d-separation query (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G which possesses the smallest number of edges. We refer to M *
It is easy to prove by construction that the minimal refutation-module M * ceived from any of their children, and do not send any message to any of their children. The variables in the sets A, B, and C initially activate in the states represented by colors green (•), red (•), and white (•), respectively. Following the prescriptions of the original Belief Propagation algorithm (Pearl, 1986 , Sections 1.3 and 2.2.3), we assume that the variables in the sets A, B, C acquire their initial states in a self-activated manner. 3 Assuming that a CBN's node can be represented at the neural level by a single (Deneve, 2008b,a) or a population of neurons (Ma et al., 2006) , self-activation reflects the content-addressability of the corresponding memory traces. D * begins with nodes in A, B, and C sending their colors as messages to their parents. Node x, upon receiving a message, follows two simple steps in the following order:
(i) If x's current color differs from that of the received message, x replies by sending back its own color as a message to the transmitter node. If x is in the state of having no color (denoted by ∅) prior to the receipt of the message, it does not send back any message to the transmitter node.
(ii) x updates its color in accord with the following primitive rules, altogether composing the Color Update Grammar (CUG):
where the syntax is: (x's current color, received message) → x's new color. If x's new color turns out to be different from its old color, with the exception of the transmitter node, x sends its new color as a message to all its parents, and only those children of x with which x has communicated before.
The rules given in the first row of the CUG correspond to white-, green-, and red-colored nodes sending their colors to their yet-uncolored parents. Rules in the second row ensure that the colors of white-, green-, and red-colored nodes persist upon interacting with nodes of the same color. Rules stated in the third row bear on the key understanding that the white color functions as a mere place-holder getting "replaced" by interacting with green-, or red-colored nodes. Rules in the fourth row guarantee the persistence of colors green and red upon interacting with white. Finally, rules given in the last row correspond to the clash event the implication of which is discussed in Remark 1 below. The reader is referred to Sec. C-VI of Appendix C for the proof of Proposition 1.
3.1 High-Level Understanding of D * D * has a simple machinery as we informally discuss here.
Upon variables in A ∪ B ∪ C sending their colors to their parents, colors white (•), green (•), and red (•) begin to propagate in a backwards manner throughout the network. In the midst of this process, white-color nodes which have a neighboring node colored either red (•) or green (•), change their color to that of their neighbors, and if a clash ever occurs between colors red and green, D * decides that the input dseparation query is false (i.e., it is a NO-instance d-separation query). Informally put, white-color nodes function as relays, which, by copying the colors of their neighbors, facilitate the possibility of a (permissible) collision between colors red and green.
A Note On The Termination of D *
According to Proposition 1, if the input d-separation query presented to D * is true (i.e., it is a YES-instance dseparation query), the system reaches a state of equilibrium in O(l An(A∪B∪C) ) time and message-passing is guaranteed to terminate in O(1) time after that. However, due to its local view, a node cannot know if such a global state has been reached. This is a fairly standard situation for an asynchronous distributed algorithm to find itself in (Mattern, 1987; Tel, 2000) , leading to the introduction of the fundamental concept of Termination-Detection (TD) in the distributed systems literature; see (Tel, 2000, Ch. 8) . There exist a variety of TD algorithms in the literature (e.g., Dijkstra et al., 1983; Mattern, 1987; Mittal et al., 2004 Mittal et al., , 2007 . For example, Mittal et al. (2004) proposed two TD algorithms, each having detection latency of O(D) where D is the diameter of the underlying graph G, and G is allowed to have an arbitrary topology.
D * in Action: A Case Study
In this section, we present an example to illustrate an execution and highlight the simplicity of D * . Consider the CBN depicted in Fig. 2(a) . Let the posed d-separation query be (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G where X = {x 1 , x 2 }, Y = {y 1 , y 2 }, and Z = {z}. According to the d-separation criterion (Pearl, 1988) , observation of z activates the path x 1 ← t 1 ← t 2 ← t 3 → t 4 ← t 5 → t 6 → t 7 → y 1 , thereby yielding the falsity of the d-separation query (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G (hence, the input is a NO-instance query); Notice that, since w is unobserved ( Fig. 2(a) ), the path x 2 → w ← y 2 indeed remains blocked (Pearl, 2000) ; this is nicely captured by the machinery of D * . Algorithm D * prevents x 2 and y 2 from sending their colors in the forward direction (i.e., along the edges pointing to w), thereby guaranteeing the occurrence of no clash along the blocked path x 2 → w ← y 2 . Also notice that, since z is observed (Fig. 2(a) ), the path x 2 ← z → y 2 is blocked as well (Pearl, 2000) . Once again the machinery of D * , due to z refraining from engaging in message-exchange with its children, ensures that no clash takes place due to the blocked path x 2 ← z → y 2 .
Technical Discussion
A number of algorithms for the implementation of dseparation are proposed in the literature (Geiger et al., 1989; Lauritzen et al., 1990; Shachter, 1998; Koller & Friedman, 2009; Butz et al., 2016) . (Geiger et al., 1989) for more discussions on this). According to Proposition 1, the time-complexity of the proposed algorithm D * is O(l An(A∪B∪C) ) where l An(A∪B∪C) denotes the length of the longest undirected path in the ancestral graph G An(A∪B∪C) . Since, for any DAG G, l An(A∪B∪C) ≤ |E| ≤ |V | 2 , the proposed algorithm D * outperforms all the previously proposed algorithms in terms of the worst-case running time. 7 5 The reader is referred to (Geiger et al., 1989 ) for a detailed analysis of the running-time of Lauritzen et al.'s algorithm. 6 The gain in particularly significant in sparse graphs, where |E| = O(|V |). (a) Particularly, the gain is significant in dense DAGs. Note that, in the limit as the underlying DAG G gets denser, the worstcase runtime performances of the previously proposed algorithms become identical, i. Another noteworthy property of D * is its tendency toward quick detection of false d-separation queries (i.e., NOinstance queries), manifested in an occurrence of a clash according to Remark 1. For a NO-instance d-separation query, Proposition 2, below, gives a more refined upper-bound on the time required for an occurrence of a clash, thereby formalizing the said claim. The reader is referred to Sec. C-III of Appendix C for the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let A = {a i } i , B = {b j } j , C = {c k } k be three disjoint sets of nodes belonging to a DAG G. 
To further highlight the significance of Proposition 3, let us consider the following nondeterministic algorithm A. Algorithm A takes as input a DAG G along with a d-separation query (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z) G , and outputs YES or NO depending on whether the input query is a YES-instance or a NO-instance query, respectively.
(i) Nondeterministically guess (1) the minimal refutation-
contains an active path, P * , between a node x * ∈ X and a node y * ∈ Y, and also contains a set of observed variables Z * ⊆ Z) 8 , and (2) the corresponding nodes x * , y * , Z * belonging to
(ii) Verify that (1) x * ∈ X, y * ∈ Y, and Z * ⊆ Z (this can be straightforwardly verified in O(|X| + |Y| + |Z * ||Z|) time),
using Geiger et al.'s algorithm (Geiger et al., 1989) Altogether, presented with a NO-instance d-separation Finally, we would like to point out an interesting property of the CUG, referred to as order-invariance, which is characterized informally as follows: The order according to which nodes in the network receive their messages is irrelevant. More formally, the order-invariance property can be stated as follows: Assume that a node x is at state S x i and upon receiving the sequence of messages M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M n ends up in state S x f . Then the following holds true for the node x. For any permutation π defined on the set {1, 2, · · · , n}, the node x, starting at state S x i , would end up in the state S x f upon receiving the sequence of messages M π(1) , M π(2) , · · · , M π(n) . The 8 Note that if P * does not contain any head-to-head node, then Z * = ∅ reader is referred to Sec. C-VIII of Appendix C for a formal treatment of the order-invariance property and its proof.
General Discussion
The Algorithm D * , in the spirit of Pearl's (1986) belief propagation scheme, employs the edges of the underlying CBN as the medium through which message-passing between nodes takes place. The latter echos Pearl's (1986) insight when he advocated the idea that a CBN must not be viewed "merely as a passive parsimonious code for storing factual knowledge but also as a computational architecture for reasoning about that knowledge." D * adheres to this idea. Recent literature in neuroscience investigating possible implementation of CBNs at the neural level supports Pearl's idea (see Lochmann & Deneve, 2011; Gershman & Beck, 2017) . Lochmann and Deneve (2011) advocate the idea that a CBN's node can be represented at the neural level by a single (Deneve, 2008a,b) or a population of neurons (Ma et al., 2006) with the neural network resembling a "mirror image" of the CBN it implements-though sometimes not a 'perfect' mirror-and the links of the neural network providing the medium for inference to be carried out-either in the form of belief propagation or sample-based methods like Gibbs sampling. 9 Interestingly, the peculiar tendency of D * toward quick detection of NO-instance d-separation queries is consistent with our pre-theoretical intuition that humans tend to detect possible dependencies between concepts and propositions rather swiftly, once such dependencies do exist. The following question then presents itself: Could this tendency be supported based on any rational grounds? In what follows we provide an argument supporting the rationality of the foregoing tendency. ( †) Assuming that the mind incurs a higher rate of loss (defined as incurred cost per unit of time) for discovering a dependency when one does exist, compared to the condition wherein one does not exist and the mind recognizes that, we formally show that the foregoing tendency is simply a consequence of the mind acting as a boundedly-rational satisficer (Simon, 1957) , trying to attain good performance in terms of expected runtime (i.e., average-case analysis). But why should the rate of loss under the condition wherein a dependency does exist be higher? Informally put, why should the mind be so hasty in detecting dependencies under that condition? One possible explanation is that it is crucial for the mind to swiftly detect dependencies under that condition, with the rationale being that delay in detecting those dependencies could be harmful to the reasoner and potentially jeopardize their life, hence important from an evolutionary standpoint. Furthermore, given the prominent role that explanation and inference play in human cognition (see Lombrozo, 2016) , it is crucial for the mind to promptly detect those factors deemed (probabilistically) relevant to the task faced by the reasoner.
Let us formally characterize a general condition under which the aforesaid tendency can be given a rational basis. 
it is rational for the mind trying to attain good performance in terms of expected runtime to demonstrate the said tendency toward quick detection of NO-instance d-separation queries. The setting portrayed in ( †) above is a special case of Condition ( * ): It corresponds to Condition ( * ) subject to the assumptions π NO = π YES (reflecting the reasoner's uninformative, a priori expectation that YES-and NO-instance queries are equiprobable) and L NO ≥ L YES (reflecting a higher rate of loss for erring on NO-instance queries, as alluded to earlier). Future work should experimentally investigate if humans demonstrate the forgoing normatively justified tendency in probabilistic (in)dependence judgment tasks, or that, on the contrary, they systematically deviate from that.
Also interestingly, the forgoing tendency of D * toward focusing its search on the minimal refutation module can be taken as evidence for its least-effort-like characteristic, and is fully consistent with recently proposed frameworks which seek rational understanding of the mind at the algorithmic level of analysis by appealing to the notion of economical use of limited computational and cognitive resources (in our case, by striving for minimizing the size of the module required to be investigated for refuting a false d-separation query); see Nobandegani (2017) and Griffiths et al. (2015) . Although we briefly discussed the idea of termination detection for asynchronous distributed algorithms, a boundedly-rational agent may decide to only run an asynchronous distributed algorithm for a period of time which is justified based on the opportunity cost incurred by delaying another task. In that light, the boundedly-rational agent may plausibly decide to adopt termination detection algorithms only in settings wherein the opportunity costs involved would be relatively low. Also notably, D * exemplifies how the pursuit of cognitive plausibility can lead to the discovery of state-of-the-art algorithms.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of D * (and, likewise, of belief propagation) is the assumption that communication channels are faultless, allowing for reliable message exchange. The brain's neural circuits involve much stochasticity and response variability (e.g., Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Ma, Beck, and Pouget, 2008; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015) 
Appendix C
Throughout Appendix C, let (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G denote the posed d-separation query with DAG G representing the topology of the underlying BN. Throughout the proofs and arguments to follow, it is assumed that communication channels are reliable, bidirectional, and first-in first-out (FIFO) (Lynch, 1996) .
For the time-complexity analysis of D * , we adhere to the same assumptions adopted in (Lynch, 1996) . More specifically, we assume: (ASM-1) an upper-bound of α for a process to perform Steps (i) and (ii) upon receipt of a message, and (ASM-2) an upper-bound of β on the delivery time for each message in a channel. Note that the parameters α and β are arbitrary but finite constants. Also note that, as the num- 
C-I.I Proof of Statement (I)
Next, the proof of Statement (I) is presented. First, the proof of the forward direction is outlined (Sec. C-I.I.I), followed by the proof of the backward direction (Sec. C-I.I.II).
10 Since the number of messages exchanged by D * on an edge is O(1), the following holds: (a) the number of messages in any channel queue is at most O(1), and (b) the number of messages awaiting in a process's send buffer is at most O(1).
C-I.I.I Proof of Statement (I): Forward Direction
We prove the forward direction of Statement (I) next. This is accomplished by proving the following: Conditioned on the set C, if there exists an unblocked path between a ∈ A and b ∈ B (for any a, b), a clash of the kind stated in Remark 1 is unavoidable during D * 's execution. A path l is said to be unblocked (Pearl, 1988) if and only if (a) for every collider node n on l, either n or some of n's descendants are in C, and (b) for every non-collider node m, m ∈ C. The proof rests on a simple understanding that a generic unblocked path can be decomposed into v-structured and non-v-structured modules as illustrated in Fig. 3 . Neighboring modules share a common vertex which we refer to as joint vertex (e.g., the nodes j 1 , j 2 in Fig. 3(a) ). The end-point vertex of a non-v-structured subpath which is not a joint vertex is termed source vertex; see Fig. 3(b1) and Fig. 3(b3) . In principle, an unblocked path may have multiple v-structured modules. For ease of exposition, the unblocked path p depicted in Fig. 3(a) possesses only one v-structured module. Note that the proof that follows does not make this restrictive assumption. Next, we prove the inevitability of a clash for unblocked paths possessing non-v-structured as well as v-structured modules. 11 The proof comprises two parts. In Part I, we show the inevitability of a clash over such an unblocked path, l * , provided that no message is destined from a node outside l * to a node belonging to l * . Using the arguments provided in Part I, in Part II we show that regardless of the messages destined from nodes outside l * to the nodes belonging to l * , the occurrence of a clash on l * is inevitable (i.e., eventually happens).
Proof of Part I:
Step (ii) of D * , along with D * 's initialization phase wherein all the nodes in the sets A, B, and C propagate their colors to their parents, ensure that all non-v-structured modules are fully explored and, by the end of exploration, all the nodes within each non-v-structured module will be homogeneously colored consistent with that of the respective source vertex, except for the joint vertex which requires more careful consideration ( †). The propagation of white (•) through the DAG G in a backward manner ensures that v-structured modules are fully explored and, by the end of exploration, all the nodes within each v-structured module will be homogeneously colored in white (•), except for the joint vertices which require more careful consideration ( ‡). The consideration advised in ( †) and ( ‡) is explicated next. 12 The joint vertex connecting a non-v-structured module to a v-structured module may first become white (•) or whatever the color of the source vertex of the non-v-structured module is, depending on whether the joint vertex first receives a message from the non-v-structured module or the v-structured module, respectively. However, and quite importantly, its color eventually becomes that of the source vertex of the non-v-structured module and, according to Step (ii) of D * , it sends its color down the v-structured module. In short, any joint vertex j will eventually serve as a relay transferring the color of one side to the other in one of the following two ways: (1) either j becomes white and then, upon receiving a red-or greencolored message from a neighbor on one side, j changes it color and sends its new color down the other side, or (2) j first becomes green or red (due to receiving, respectively, a green or red message from a neighbor on one side) and then receives a white-colored message (•) from a neighbor w residing on the other side, upon which-in an act analogous to handshaking in communication networks-j sends back its color to w which, in turn, initiates a chain reaction thereby w and its white-colored neighbors alter their color to that of j and so do their white-colored neighbors and so forth. This key understanding that joint vertices, as just explained, essentially serve as a relay transferring the color of one module to the other neighboring module, in addition to the fact that the color of the two source vertices are different, together, grants the conclusion that a clash between the colors green and red along the unblocked path l * eventually takes place. This concludes the proof of Part I. Proof of Part II: As stated earlier, Part II concerns with showing the following: A message received by a node belonging to an unblocked path l * which is sent from a node lying outside l * cannot prevent the clash from happening on l * . That is, informally, the occurrence of a clash cannot be prevented by any message coming from a node residing outside l * to a one belonging to l * , say n in . We consider all the possible scenarios (i.e., scenarios (c1) to (c6) listed below) and show that indeed the claim of Part II holds true. Before we proceed further, let us introduce a notation. Let α, β denote the following: n in 's current color is α and the color of the message (coming from a node residing outside l * ) destined to n in is β. For example, •, • implies that n in 's current color is white and the incoming message is red. According to (Pearl, 1988) , the statement "C d-separates A from B in G" is equivalent to the following: Every path between any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B is blocked. According to (Pearl, 1988) , a path l is said to be blocked if and only if at least one of the two statements holds: (a2) There exists a collider node n on l where neither n nor any of n's descendants is in C, (b2) There exists a non-collider node m on l where m ∈ C. Therefore, altogether, the statement "C d-separates A from B in G" is equivalent to the statement that every path connecting a ∈ A and b ∈ B has to at least contain a subpath of the type specified in (a2) and (b2). Hence, for a clash to take place on path l, one of the colors green or red has to pass through l's corresponding subpath and collide with the other color. In what follows, we consider all such subpaths and show that, the very existence of such subpaths on every path connecting a ∈ A and b ∈ B, grants the impossibility of an occurrence of a clash during D * 's execution. These subpaths can be of three types: (1) the green node and the red node are separated by a head-to-tail node which is observed (Fig. 4(a) ), (2) the green node and the red node are separated by a common cause (aka confounder) which is observed (Fig. 4(b) ), and finally (3) the green node and the red node are separated by a common effect (aka collider) which is neither itself nor any of its descendants is observed (Fig. 4(c) ). lider to be white-colored so that, by being replaced by either green or red, it would allow colors green and red to meet and hence a clash would occur. However, since (i) neither the collider nor any of its descendants is observed (and hence none of them are white), and also (ii) D * 's machinery dictates the propagation of the color white in a backwards manner through the corresponding ancestors of the white-colored nodes, altogether, the collider cannot become white during an execution of D * . This concludes the proof.
C-I.II Proof of Statement (II)
The state transition diagram for D * is given in Fig. 5 . The states represent a node's color and the edges represent transitions due to receiving messages whose colors are depicted on the edges. The message which ought to be received for a transition to take place is depicted on the corresponding edge. In case multiple messages engender the same transition, they are all detailed on the corresponding edge separated by slashes.
A simple inspection of the diagram reveals that a node's color cannot alternate between any two states. This is due to the fact that the diagram has no cycles of length two or greater. This observation implies that either a clash takes place upon which D * decides that the input d-separation query is false, or a state of equilibrium will eventually be reached. By definition, equilibrium is a global state of a network G according to which none of the nodes in G alters its state (i.e., its color) once that state is reached. This concludes the proof of Statement (II).
C-I.III Proof of Statement (III)
In the analysis to follow, we adhere to Assumptions (ASM-1) and (ASM-2) presented in the first paragraph of Appendix C. We analyze all potential post-equilibrium, in-transit messages. 14 An in-transit message can be of three colors: (a1) green, (b1) red, or (c1) white. We consider each possibility next. Case (a1): If the state of equilibrium has indeed been reached, a green-colored in-transit message must be destined to a green-colored node. Indeed, if the green-colored intransit message were destined to a red-, white-, or ∅-colored node, it would lead, respectively, to a clash, a change in the color of the destination node, and once again, a change in the color of the destination node-all of which are in contradiction with the assumption that the state of equilibrium has already been reached. According to D * , therefore, a green-colored in-transit message will be absorbed by the corresponding destination node (which is of the same color) in time at most β leading to the generation of no new messages. The same line of reasoning can be adopted to conclude the following (Case (b1)): A red-colored in-transit message will be absorbed by the corresponding destination node (which is of the same color) in time at most β leading to the generation of no new messages. Next, we consider the possibility of an in-transit message being white. A white-colored in-transit message could be destined to: (a2) a white-colored node, (b2) a green-colored node, or (c2) a red-colored node. (A whitecolored in-transit cannot be destined to an ∅-colored node, as it would lead to a change in the color of the destination node-contradicting with the equilibrium assumption.) We consider each possibility in order. Case (a2): A white-colored in-transit message which is destined to a white-colored node reaches its destination in time at most β and, according to D * , will be absorbed upon reception leading to the generation of no new messages. Case (b2): A white-colored in-transit message from node x to a green-colored node g reaches its destination, g, in time at most β and, according to Step (i) of D * , g replies, in time at most α, by sending a green-colored message to x which, according to Case (a1), will be absorbed by x without generating any further new messages. (Note that, according to the CUG, the receipt of a white-colored message by a green-colored node does not lead to any color update, and hence g does not generate any messages due to Step (ii) of D * .) Case (c2) can be handled in the same manner as Case (b2).
C-II Time-Complexity Analysis of D *
We present the results in the form of two lemmas as follows.
Lemma C.1. For a given DAG G and disjoint sets A, B, and C, if (A ⊥ B|C) G (hence, a NO-instance d-separation query), then D * 's execution grants that a clash of the kind stated in Remark 1 occurs in O(l An(A∪B∪C) ) time where l An(A∪B∪C) denotes the length of the longest undirected path in the ancestral graph G An(A∪B∪C) .
Proof. The proof relies on the high-level understanding of D * 's machinery as discussed in Sec. 3.1, and Statements
(1) and (2) of Proposition 1 (see Sec. C-VI of Appendix C for the proof). To obtain an upper bound on the time it takes for the clash to happen, we perform the propagation of colors through the DAG G in two phases as follows. Phase-I: Starting at the nodes in C, color white (•) propagates backwards through the DAG G. Phase-I ensures that all the nodes in G which could potentially become white in the absence of colors red and green in the graph, indeed become white. Adopting (ASM-1) and (ASM-2) and the notation introduced therein, Phase-I is completed by time (α + β)l d An(A∪B∪C) where l d An(A∪B∪C) denotes the longest directed path in G An(A∪B∪C) . Hence, Phase-I takes O(l d An(A∪B∪C) ) time. Phase-II: colors green (•) and red (•) (corresponding to the nodes in A and B, respectively) will be introduced back into G and begin to propagate through G as dictated by the machinery of D * until along some path between a node in A and a node in B a clash takes place. 15 Adopting (ASM-1) and (ASM-2) and the notation introduced therein, after the completion of Phase-I, within time (α + β)l An(A∪B∪C) a clash takes place on a path between a node in A and a node in B where l An(A∪B∪C) denote the length of the longest undirected path in G An(A∪B∪C) . Hence, putting Phase-I and Phase-II together, by time (α+β)(l d An(A∪B∪C) +l An(A∪B∪C) ) a clash takes place. Note that the parameters α and β are arbitrary but finite constants. Since for any DAG G, l An(A∪B∪C) ≥ l d An(A∪B∪C) , the claimed upper bound O(l An(A∪B∪C) ) follows.
Using the above line of reasoning, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.2. For a given DAG G and disjoint sets A, B, and C, if (A ⊥ ⊥ B|C) G (hence, a YES-instance query), then D * 's execution grants that a state of equilibrium will be reached in O(l An(A∪B∪C) ) time where l An(A∪B∪C) denotes the length of the longest undirected path in ancestral graph G An (A∪B∪C) .
Note that, in the context of Lemma C.2, the inevitability of equilibrium state follows from Statement (1) of Proposition 1 and Statement II given in Sec. C-I of Appendix C.
